for, respectively, the aforementioned basket and the particular good produced by firm j in island i.
In equilibrium, consumption coincides with production. It follows that the inverse demand function faced by firm j in island i is given by
where
is taken as given by the individual firm but is determined endogenously within the island.
Consider now the optimal behavior of the individual firm. Given that the marginal value of (nominal) income for the representative household is U 0 (Y t )/P t , the firm's objective is simply the local expectation of its profit times U 0 (Y t )/P t . Using (14) , this can be expressed as follows:
Using y ijt = A i n ijt and taking the FOC with respect to n ijt gives
By the fact that all firms within a given island are symmetric, we have that, in equilibrium,
and the above condition reduces to
Finally, consider the optimal labor supply in island i. The relevant FOC for the household is
Combining the above two conditions and letting M it ⌘ 1 1 ⌧ it ⌘ it ⌘ it 1 gives condition (1). ⌅ Proof of Lemma 1. Taking logs of both sides of (1) and rearranging gives us
Assuming Y t is log-normal (which we verify below), the latter can be rewritten as
Note that a > 0 and µ < 0, reflecting the fact that local output increases with local productivity and decreases with the local level of monopoly power. Finally, ↵ could be either positive or negative, but it is necessarily less than 1. ⌅ Proof of Lemma 2. Welfare is given by
measures the unconditional expectation of the welfare flow in period t. Because the aggregate shocks are i.i.d. across time and all second moments are time-invariant, 2 the unconditional expectations of all the objects that enter into W t are time-invariant, and hence W t is itself a time-invariant function of the underlying preference, technology, and information parameters. To simplify the notation, we thus drop the time index t in the rest of this proof and proceed to develop a certain decomposition of the welfare flow W for an arbitrary period.
Before doing this, we highlight a property of log-normal distributions that is utilized repeatedly in this appendix. When a variable X is log-normal with ln X ⇠ N x, 2 , then, for any 2 R, we have that E[X ] = exp x + 1 2 2 2 = exp x + 1 2 2 exp 1 2 ( 1) 2 and therefore
We use this property again and again in the derivations that follow, for various X and .
Consider the first component of W , which corresponds to the utility of consumption and which is given by 1 1 E Y 1 . Noting that equilibrium Y is log-normal and using the log-normal property, , and using once again the log-normal property, we can express the realized disutility of labor, in any given state, as follows:
and where ⇥ ⌘ (Y, B) encapsulates the aggregate state of the economy. It follows that the expected disutility of labor is given by
where we have used once again the property from (15) to obtain
. Because of our Gaussian specification, the variance and covariance terms that enter H and G above are constants (non-random and time-invariant), and hence H and G are themselves constants.
Combining (16) and (17), we infer that the per-period welfare is given by
Next, let us defineŶ as the value of E (Y ) that maximizes expression (18) for W , taking as given B, G, and V ar (log Y ). Clearly, this is given by taking the FOC of (18) with respect to E(Y ) and equating this with 0, or equivalently by the solution to the following condition:
We can then restate W as follows:
Letting
, we conclude that
The term v( ) therefore identifies the wedge between actual welfare, W , and the reference level W that a planner could have a↵orded if he had a non-contingent subsidy that permitted him to scale up and down the mean level of output and could use it to maximize welfare. To see this more clearly, note that v( ) is strictly concave in and reaches its maximum at = 1 when < 1, whereas it is strictly convex and reaches its minimum at = 1 when > 1. Along with the fact thatŴ > 0 when < 1 butŴ < 0 when > 1 (this fact will be come clear momentarily), this means thatŴ v( ) is always strictly concave in , with the maximum attained at = 1.
So far, we have decomposed the per-period welfare flow as W =Ŵ v( ). In what follows, we proceed to decompose the reference levelŴ itself into the product of two terms: the first-best level W ⇤ ; and a function of ⇤, which encapsulates the welfare losses of volatility and dispersion.
From (19), we have that
which together with (20) giveŝ
Now, note that the first-best levels of output are given by the fixed point to the following equation:
It follows that, up to some constants that we omit for notational simplicity,
Using this result towards replacing the terms in⌦ that involve b i and B, we get
Furthermore, the first-best level of welfare is given by
where ⌦ ⇤ obtains from⌦ once we replace y i and Y with, respectively, y ⇤ i and Y ⇤ (which have themselves been obtained above as functions of the exogenous objects b i and B). We conclude that
Finally, using the definitions of⌦ and ⌦ ⇤ together with 1 ↵ = ✏+ ✏+1/⇢ , we havê
Note that conditioning on ⇥ ⌘ (log Y, log B) is equivalent to conditioning on (log Y, log Y ⇤ ). Furthermore, because log Y and log Y ⇤ are the cross-sectional means (expectations) of, respectively, log y i and log y ⇤ i , we have that
Combining the above results with the definitions of ⌃, and ⇤, yieldŝ
and therefore (24) can be restated aŝ
which gives the sought-after decomposition ofŴ .
Note from (23) that the sign of W ⇤ is the same as the sign of (1 ). It follows that the sign ofŴ is also the same as that of (1 ), which in turn verifies the claim made earlier on that the productŴ v( ) is strictly convex in with a maximum value of 1 attained at = 1.
Finally, combining (25) with (21), we conclude that
The proof is then completed by noting once again that W ⇤ has the same sign as 1 and therefore that w is a strictly decreasing function of ⇤, regardless of whether is greater or smaller than 1. The fact that W is strictly concave in , with a maximum attained at = 1, follows directly from our earlier observation that W = v( )Ŵ has these exact properties. ⌅ Equilibrium with productivity shocks. Suppose the equilibrium production strategy takes a log-linear form:
for some coe cients (' a , ' x , ' z ). Aggregate output is then given by
where, by standard Gaussian updating,
Because of the log-normality of Y t , the fixed-point condition (1) reduces to following:
i ⇡μ +⌧ > 0 is the overall distortion caused by the monopoly markup and the labor wedge (which are both constant because we are herein focusing on the case with only productivity shocks), and
Next, combining (31) with (27) and (29), we obtain
For this to coincide with our initial guess in (26) for every realization of shocks and signals, it is necessary and su cient that the coe cients (' 0 , ' a , ' x , ' z ) solve the following system:
The unique solution to this system is given by the following:
and ' 0 = 0 s + 1 1 ↵ (↵X + ) Note then that the coe cients '
x and ' z , which capture the individual response to expectations of the aggregate state, are positive if and only if ↵ > 0. ⌅ Proof of Proposition 1. Using the characterization of the equilibrium allocation in the preceding proof along with that of the first best in the proof of Lemma 2, we can calculate the equilibrium value of the aggregate and local output gaps as follows:
It follows that the volatility of the aggregate output gap is
and the cross-sectional dispersion of the local output gaps is
Taking the derivative of ⌃ with respect to the precision of public information gives
which is necessarily negative.
Similarly, taking the derivatives of ⌃ and with respect to the precision of private information, we obtain @⌃ @
Proof of Theorem 1. From the proof of Proposition 1, we can rewrite ⇤ as
from which it is immediate that ⇤ is decreasing in the precision of either public or private information, regardless of the sign of ↵. Furthermore,
which is itself negative if and only if ↵ > 0. Finally, note that the distortion in the mean level of output is given by
where⌘ 1 ⌘ is the monopoly wedge (the reciprocal of the markup) and 1 ⌧ is the labor wedge. Since is invariant to the information structure, the welfare e↵ects of either type of information are captured by the comparative statics of ⇤ alone, which have been established above. ⌅ Equilibrium with markup shocks. This follows very similar steps as the characterization of equilibrium in the case with productivity shocks. Suppose equilibrium output takes a log-linear form:
. This guarantees that aggregate output is log-normal, which in turn implies that the fixed-point condition (1) now reduces to
where , 0 , and are defined as in the case with productivity shocks. Following similar steps as in that case, we can then show that the unique equilibrium coe cients are given by the following:
and ' 0 = ā + 1 1 ↵ (↵X + ) Note that the sign of the coe cients '
x and ' z is once again pinned down by the sign of ↵. ⌅ Proof of Proposition 2. With only markup shocks, the first-best levels of output are constant.
The volatility of aggregate output gaps and the dispersion of local output gaps are thus given by the following:
Next, taking the derivatives with respect to the precision of public information, we obtain
which is in general ambiguous. ⌅ Proof of Proposition 3. Using (32) and (33), we can obtain the equilibrium value of ⇤ as
(Note that the first term captures the distortion caused by cross-sectional dispersion in actual markups, whereas the second terms captures the distortion caused by the firms' response to their information about the aggregate markup.) It follows that, regardless of the sign of ↵,
which proves that ⇤ increases with the precision of either public or private information, regardless of the sign of ↵. ⌅ Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that is given by the ratio of the equilibrium value of expected output, E[Y ], to the corresponding optimal value,Ŷ . The former can be computed from the preceding equilibrium characterization and the latter from condition (19). After some tedious algebra (which is available upon request), we can thus show that
That is, is increasing in the precision of either public or private information, irrespective of whether ↵ is positive or negative. ⌅ Proof of Theorem 2. To obtain the overall welfare e↵ect, recall that welfare is given by
Consider first the case of public information. From the above, we have that
From (34) and (36), we have that @ @
and, therefore,
Note then that the sign of W ⇤ is the same as that of (1 ) which, together with the facts that @⇤ @z > 0 and > 0, implies that the sign of @W @z is the same as the sign of (1 + ✏) (1 + 2✏ + ) ✏+ . We conclude that @W @
Consider next the case of private information. From (35) and (37), we have that
as in the case of public information. It follows that
where H is defined as before. By direct implication,
whereˆ is the same threshold as the one in the case of public information.
Clearly, when a non-contingent subsidy is set optimally, E[Y ] =Ŷ or = 1 >ˆ . ⌅
Appendix B: Auxiliary Results and Proofs for Extended Model
This appendix contains the proofs for Section 4, along with a number of auxiliary results. In Section B.1, we provide a characterization of the set of implementable allocations, that is, the set of all allocations that can be part of an equilibrium for some monetary policy; we also show that this set remains the same whether monetary policy responds to the state within the same period or with a lag. In Section B.2, we develop a preliminary welfare decomposition, which forms the basis of the particular decompositions that appear in the main text. In Section B.4, we use a numerical example to illustrate an argument made in the main text. In Section B.4, we collect the proofs for all results that appear either in the main text or in Sections B.1 and B.2 of this appendix.
B.1 Equilibrium and Implementability
The equilibrium is defined in a similar manner as in the baseline model, modulo the fact that prices are now set on the basis of incomplete information. Consider the FOCs of firm i, who chooses n it and p it so as to maximize the expected valuation of its profit. Combining these conditions with the household's FOC for labor supply and for the demand of the di↵erent commodities, we obtain the following conditions:
These conditions are the analogue of condition (1) from the baseline model and identify two of the four key implementability conditions of the general model. The third condition follows form the household's optimal demand for the di↵erent commodities and ties relative prices to relative quantities:
The last condition follows from the Euler condition of the household and ties the nominal interest rate to output growth and inflation:
To recap, a combination of quantities and prices are part of an equilibrium if and only if (i) the quantities and prices satisfy conditions (38) through (41) and (ii) monetary policy satisfies (42).
We now proceed to restate these conditions in a manner that facilitates our subsequent analysis.
For expositional purposes, this is done in three steps. First, in Lemma 6, we restrict attention to the subset of equilibria in which the interest rate is measurable in the current fundamental and the current public signal. Next, in Lemma 7, we show that exactly the same real outcomes as those in Lemma 6 obtain if we instead consider the subset of equilibria in which the interest rate is measurable in the value of the shock at some past period (i.e., if policy reacts with the lag). It is then immediate that the set of implementable allocations remain the same if we also consider the more general case in which the interest rate is arbitrary function of the entire history of the shock. Clearly, the same applies for the public signal. We thus conclude the characterization in Lemma 8 by considering the residual case in which the interest rate depends also on a shock that is orthogonal to the entire history of the fundamental and the public signal. Throughout, we let s it ands t denote the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to fundamentals (technology or markups).
Lemma 6 Suppose that the nominal interest rate satisfies
for some coe cients rs and r z , and consider the following pair of strategies: 3
(i) When prices are set on the basis of incomplete information, a pair of strategies as in (43) can be implemented as part of an equilibrium if and only if the following conditions are satisfied: 4
whereˆ s is given in (52), 1 s=a is an indicator that takes the value 1 in the case of technology shocks (s = a) and 0 in the case of markup shocks (s = µ),
x , 0 x , z , 0 z are scalars given in the proof, and ls is an arbitrary coe cient.
(ii) When instead prices are flexible (i.e., free to adjust to the true sate), there exists a unique pair of strategies as in (43) that can obtain in equilibrium, and this pair is pinned down by the combination of conditions (44)-(49) along with the following condition:
This lemma identifies the precise way in which monetary policy can control real allocations.
When prices are set on the basis of incomplete information, by appropriately designing the response of the interest rate to the realized shock, the policy maker can choose at will the coe cient ls, that is, the response of the second-stage labor input (the margin of adjustment in quantities) to the realized technology or markup shock. Conditional on choosing this coe cient, however, the monetary authority has no further control over the real allocation. In this sense, the coe cient coe cient ls is the only "free variable" at the disposal of the policy maker. Finally, when prices are flexible (free to adjust to the realized shock), this variable ceases to be free, and the policy maker has, of course, no control over real allocations (although he can still control the nominal price level).
We now proceed to show that the set of implementable allocations remains the same whether monetary policy responds to the realized state within the same period or with an arbitrary lag.
Lemma 7 Suppose that the nominal interest rate satisfies
for some k 1 and some scalars ⇢ k and ⇢ z . Parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 6 continue to hold. That is, the set of implementable allocations remains the same.
By a similar argument as the one found in the proof of this lemma, the set of implementable allocations remains the same if we consider the more general class of policies in which the interest rate is an arbitrary function of the entire history of the fundamental and the public signal. We thus conclude this section by extending Lemma 6 to the only case that has not been allowed so far, namely allowing for the interest rate to contain a pure monetary shock, by which we mean a shock orthogonal to both the fundamental and the public signal (and the histories thereof). This makes no essential di↵erence to the logic underlying the implementability constraints we derived in Lemma 6. It only introduces a mechanical response of output to the monetary shock. 5
Lemma 8 Suppose that the nominal interest rate satisfies
where r t is a Normally distributed random variable that is orthogonal to boths t and z t and that is unpredictable by the firms. Then, the second-period labor choice satisfies:
However, the strategy for q it remains the same and the implementability conditions (44)-(49) are also not a↵ected.
B.2 Welfare
In this subsection, we obtain a preliminary welfare decomposition, which extends Lemma 2 from the baseline model to the more general model under consideration.
To this goal, we first introduce certain notation:
As in the main text, we also let q it ⌘ A it n ✓ it denote the component of output that is fixed on the basis of the firm's incomplete information of the state of the economy, and define the corresponding aggregate as
Next, we denote with logȳ it and logȲ t the socially optimal levels of, respectively, local and aggregate output, conditional on an arbitrary allocation of the q's; and with log q ⇤ it and log Q ⇤ t the first-best levels of, respectively, log q it and log Q t . Finally, we let ⌃ Q and q denote, respectively, the volatility of log Q it . The first of the following two lemmas characterizes the aforementioned reference points, the first best and the allocation that is optimal conditional on q's. The second lemma then develops the desired welfare decomposition in terms of gaps relative to these reference points.
Lemma 9 For any given distribution of q in the cross-section, the optimal output levels solve the following fixed-point relation:
The first-best allocation satisfies the following fixed-point relation:
Lemma 10 There exists a decreasing function w, which is invariant to the information structure, such that welfare satisfies
and whereˆ and✏ are given in (52) and ⇠ is a positive scalar pinned down by ( , ✏, ✓, ⌘).
Like Lemma 2 in the baseline model, Lemma 10 is not particularly surprising. It simply decomposes the welfare losses that obtain relative to the first-best in two components. The first component, namely the sum ⌃ Q + 1 1 ↵ q , capture the distortions (if any) that obtain in the firststage production decisions, that is, those that must be set on the basis of incomplete information.
The second component, namely the sum ⌃ Y + 1 1 ↵ y , captures the distortions (if any) that obtain in the second-stage production decisions, that is, those that are free to adjust to the realized state.
Each of these components contains a volatility and a dispersion subcomponent, reflecting the fact that some distortions are aggregate whereas others are idiosyncratic.
What is interesting, however, is how these components are a↵ected by the information frictions and by the associated types of rigidity. To develop intuition, let us abstract from markup shocks.
When information is complete, all distortions vanish, ⌃ Q = ⌃ q = ⌃ Y = ⌃ y = 0, and hence ⇤ 0 = 0. When, instead, information is incomplete, the nature of the distortions depends on whether the incompleteness of information is only the source of real rigidity or also the source of nominal rigidity.
In the former case, ⌃ Q and ⌃ q are positive, reflecting the measurability constraint on quantities, but ⌃ Y = ⌃ y = 0, reflecting the margin of adjustment in second-stage production to the realized state. In the latter case, by contrast, whether ⌃ Y and ⌃ y coincide or diverge from zero depends on whether monetary policy coincides or diverges from the benchmark of replicating flexible prices.
This discussion therefore underscores how the two types of rigidity map into di↵erent kinds of potential distortions, an issue that is further explored in the main text.
B.3 An Example With Di↵erent Policy Targets
In the main text, we noted that, if monetary policy tries to stabilize either the price level or the output gap, more precise information may help increase welfare not only by attenuating the real rigidity but also by alleviating the policy suboptimality. We now illustrate the logic behind this argument in Figure B1 , with the help of a numerical example. This example assumes the following parameterization: ✓ = ⌘ = 0.5, ✏ = 1, = 0.25, ⇢ = 0.5, a = x = z = .02, and m = ✏ = 0. The figure reports the welfare e↵ects of public information (namely the value of ⇤ against the value of z ) under three alternative specifications of the monetary policy: the optimal policy (solid blue line), a policy that stabilizes the aggregate output gap (dotted red line), and a policy that stabilizes the price level (dashed green line). The last two policies are suboptimal in our model due to the presence of the informational friction, but are useful reference points because they are optimal in the prototypical New-Keynesian model.
For any level of noise z > 0, the welfare losses associated with targeting either the price level or the output gap are higher than those associated with the optimal policy. Nevertheless, the welfare gap between these policies and the optimal one decreases with the precision of the available information, and vanishes in the limit as z ! 0. It follows that, under either of these two policies, more information improves welfare via two e↵ects: by bringing the equilibrium allocation closer to the optimal one; and by raising the welfare attained at the optimal allocation. We hope that these findings give some guidance about the potential role of policies which are not exactly optimal in our setting but are perhaps closer to real-world practice, such as a policies that follow a Taylor rule. We nevertheless have to leave any serious quantitative exploration of the issue for future work.
B.4 Proofs
In this subsection, we provide first the proofs of the auxiliary results we stated in parts B.1 and B.2 of this appendix and next the proofs of the results that appear in Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 6. Part (i). The proof combines the first-order conditions of the firm's problem with the resource constraint and the monetary policy rule. These are used to derive the conditions that the coe cients in (43) have to satisfy in order to be part of an equilibrium.
We now seek to translate these properties in terms of the relevant coe cients that parameterize the allocations, prices, and policy under a log-normal specification. First note that, since all shocks (42) will be constant. Thus, let (omitting unimportant constants)
for some coe cients (' s , ' x , ...., z ), and with the understanding that s stands either for a or µ, depending on whether we are considering the case of technology or markup shocks. Note that the resource constraint (40) is satisfied if and only if
while (42) is satisfied if and only if
Consider the consumer's demand function (41), which can be expressed as follows:
Using market clearing, the production function, and the proposed strategies, we can express the output of good i as follows:
Substituting the above two results in the consumer's demand function, and doing a similar substitution for p it and P t , we infer that the following must hold for all realizations of shocks and signals:
This is true if and only if
Finally, taking the logs of conditions (38) and (39) and using the properties of log-normal distributions, we can rewrite these conditions as follows:
Clearly, condition (62) holds for all i if and only if 
We can now use (57)-(58) to replace cs and c z in (68) and (69) to get '
x =↵ ('
, with the understanding that s stands for either a or µ, depending on the case under consideration.
Using (64), (65), (66), and (67) and rearranging gives
This completes the proof of the necessity of conditions (44)-(49) for an allocation to be part of an equilibrium.
We now prove su ciency. Pick arbitrary ls and let (' s , ' x , ' z , l s , l x , l z ) be the unique vector that satisfies conditions (44) through (49) for the given ls. Next, let (cs, c z , ⇢s, ⇢ z , s , x ) be determined as in (57)-(61) and let z = c z . By construction, the allocations, prices and policies defined in this way constitute an equilibrium, which completes the su ciency argument.
Part (ii). This proof is the same as that of part (i), except for one key di↵erence: now the marginal costs and returns of second-state employment must be equated state-by-state, not just in expectation. It is this additional restriction that pins down ls at the value stated in equation (50) in the lemma. A detailed derivation is available upon request. ⌅ Proof of Lemma 7. Before proceeding, it is useful to recall two key facts about Lemma 6. First, Lemma 6 established that, when the interest rate is determined according to (42), an allocation as in (43) can be implemented as part of an equilibrium if and only if conditions (44)-(49) are satisfied. Second, the nominal prices that supported such an allocation (i.e., that were consistent with the firm's optimal price-setting behavior) were left outside the statement of that lemma, but were constructed as part of its proof. With this in mind, the strategy underlying the present proof is to show that the class of policies in (51) spans exactly the same set of allocations as the class of policies in (42), but now the nominal prices that support any such allocation are di↵erent. Thus let us start by collecting, once again, the key equilibrium conditions:
Clearly, these conditions are necessary and su cient for equilibrium regardless of how R t is determined. Now, let us restrict R t to be determined according to (51) and let us consider the following strategies (omitting unimportant constants):
for some coe cients (' s , ' x , ..., k ). The proof proceeds by obtaining the restrictions that equilibrium imposes on these coe cients and by showing that the restrictions imposed on the ''s and the l's (the quantity-related coe cients) are the same as those found in Lemma 6, whereas those that are imposed on the 's (the price-related coe cients) are di↵erent. The proof then concludes by obtaining the scalars ⇢ k and ⇢ z that implement these coe cients. First, consider conditions (70) and (71), which encapsulated the optimal behavior of the firms and the workers. These conditions can be restated as:
Because the proposed strategies for q it and l it are the same as those in Lemma 6, and because neither the prices nor the interest rate enter into the above conditions, these conditions reduce to exactly the same restrictions on the and the l coe cients as those in Lemma 6.
Next, consider condition (72). Under the proposed strategies, this reduces to
Similarly to the case of the and the l coe cients, the restrictions that pertain to the coe cients cs and c s are therefore the same as the corresponding ones in the proof of Lemma 6. Next, consider condition (73), which can be expressed as follows:
Under the proposed strategies, this reduces to the following:
This in turn is true if and only if
The restrictions on the coe cients s and x are therefore also the same as the corresponding ones in the proof of Lemma 6. (Also note that, up to this point, the coe cients k and z are "free".) Finally, consider the Euler condition (74). Let X t ⌘ log Y t + log P t and rewrite (74) as follows:
]. Iterating this condition forward k times yields
Under the proposed strategies, the output and price level in period t + k + 1 satisfy From (51) , the interest rate satisfies
for j = 0 for j 2 {1, ..., k 1}
for j = k It follows that (77) reduces to the following (omitting constants):
Proof of Lemma 9. As in the baseline model, once we use the equilibrium conditions for the wages and the prices, the first-best level of output conditional on log q it satisfies the following FOC of the firm's profit with respect to the second input:
Furthermore, the first-best level of output satisfies (81) and, in addition, the following FOC of the firm's profit with respect to the first input:
Note that, by definition of the first-best level of output, the markup and the expectation operator are absent from both conditions.
Rearranging (81) to solve for log l it (and omitting unimportant constants)
and using log y it = log q it + ⌘ log l it to replace l it , we can restate the above as
which proves (53). Using (53) to replace y it in (82), taking logs, and noting that log 
We will proceed to establish that the above can be expressed as follows:
where W ⇤ is the first-best level of W .
We first focus on the first and third component of W :
This expression resembles the expression for welfare in the baseline model with q i replacing local productivity a i . We can thus follow the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2 and rewrite the latter expression as (omitting unimportant constants)
where the second line uses the fact that (53) implies logȲ = ⇢⌫ 1 ↵ log Q. We can use these results to rewrite W as follows:
Using property (15),
we have that
or, using the definition of⌦,
Note then that the functional that maps the strategy q into the welfare level W is the same as the one in the proof of Lemma 2, provided that we make two changes: we replace ⇢, , and ✏ with, respectively,⇢,ˆ , and✏; and we accommodate the constant ⌅. Thus, following the same steps as in that proof, we can obtain the following characterization of the per-period welfare flow:
Finally, using the definition of ⌅ and rearranging gives us
The result then follows from translating the above in terms of life-time welfare and defining the function w (·) as w(x) ⌘ W ⇤ exp 1 2 (1 ˆ ) (1 +✏) x . ⌅ Proof of Proposition 5. Part (i). As in the proof of Lemma 6, once we use the equilibrium conditions for the wages and the prices, the FOCs of the firm's profit with respect to the two inputs reduce to the following:
Note that the first condition is the same as (38). The second condition, by contrast, does not feature an expectation operator, because the absence of nominal rigidity means that the stage-2 input adjusts so as to equate marginal cost and marginal revenue state-by-state. Rearranging (86) to solve for log l it (and omitting unimportant constants)
Using the above result to replace y it in (85), taking logs, and noting that log q it = a it + ✓ log n it , we arrive at 
Thus, Part (ii) . From Lemma 10 we have that, irrespective of whether the nominal rigidity is present or not, welfare is a decreasing function of
When the policy of Lemma 4 is in place, the equilibrium quantities satisfy the FOC (86) which, as shown in part (i), can be rearranged as
On the other hand, Lemma 9 shows that the first-best level of output conditional on the first-period equilibrium production decision satisfies logȳ it = b q log q it +↵ logȲ t . Therefore, the aggregate and local gaps are given by, respectively,
Importantly, note that b µ and bμ are independent of the information structure. It follows that the second term in ⇤ 0 reduces to
which is independent of the information structure. Therefore, (56) reduces to
, corresponding to equation (11) in the main text. ⌅ Proof of Theorem 3. From Proposition 5, when the policy that replicates flexible prices is in place, welfare is a decreasing function of
Since ! is independent of the information structure, the e↵ects of the precision of private and public information are determined only by the changes in the volatility and dispersion of the first-period gaps.
Consider first the case with technology shocks. In that caseˆ µ =ˆ μ = 0 and ! = 0 and the welfare e↵ects coincide with those found in Theorem 1.
In the case of markup shocks,ˆ µ is given in (52) (1 ↵) ⇠ + !. Di↵erentiating ⇤ 0 with respect to the precision of, respectively, public and private information gives
(1 ↵)(1+✏) 2 (µ+(1 ↵)x+z) 2 , which are both always positive. ⌅ Proof of Proposition 6. While derivations are lengthy, the idea of the proof is simple. From Lemma 10 we know that welfare losses ⇤ 0 depend on the volatility and dispersion of the first-period and second-period gaps between equilibrium and first-best production. We thus take each gap and decompose it into two new gaps: the first captures the deviation of equilibrium production from production with flexible prices; and the second captures the deviation of flexible-price production from first-best production. Finally, we rewrite the volatility and dispersion of the original gaps in terms of the volatility and dispersion of the new gaps.
We introduce some notation which will simplify the expressions in the proof. First, we letq it denote first-period output when monetary policy replicates flexible prices. Next, we decompose the first-period output gap as follows
where logq it ⌘ log q it logq it denotes the deviation of first-period equilibrium production from the flexible-price benchmark, and where logq it ⌘ logq it log q ⇤ it denotes the usual output gap with flexible prices. With the same notation we obtain a similar decomposition for the second-period output gap: Collecting all the remaining terms together, the second-order welfare losses associated with the first-period gaps can be rewritten as (86) we can then obtain an expression similar to (53), except for a constant capturing the markup. Thus, with technology shocks flexibleprice allocations and first-best allocations conditional on equilibrium first-period production di↵er only by a constant and, thus, there is no use in decomposing the second-period gaps as we did for the first-period gaps. Using the conditions in Lemma 6, the second-period aggregate and local gaps are, respectively, logỸ t =Ỹ ā a (lā l ⇤ a )ā t +Ỹ a z (lā l ⇤ a ) " (lā l ⇤ a ) 2 1 x . Collecting all terms, the second-order welfare losses associated with the second-period gaps can be rewritten as 
